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Abstract 
 
Hobbs (1979) (‘Coherence and Coreference’, Cognitive Science 3, 67-90) claims that the interpretation of inter-
sentential anaphors ‘falls out’ as a ‘by-product’ of using a particular coherence relation to integrate two 
discourse units.  The article argues that this is only partly true. Taking the reader’s perspective, I suggest that 
there are three stages in invoking and implementing a given coherence relation to integrate two discourse units 
when updating a given discourse context. Interleaved with these are two distinguishable levels in the assignment 
of reference to the anaphor(s) in the second unit: first, through a search for evidence for the appropriateness of a 
given anticipated relation, the reader will provisionally assign a referent to the anaphor(s) in the second unit via 
the semantic structure within the relation’s definition (this would correspond to Hobbs’s original thesis); and 
second, in coming to a final decision as to the applicability of the coherence relation(s), the anaphor(s) will 
receive a full, expanded interpretation. This in turn will serve to actually implement the coherence relation 
initially assumed.  In more general terms, the article aims to pinpoint the precise nature of the interactions 
between the invocation and implementation of given coherence relations and the functioning of anaphors in non-
initial units, in processing multi-propositional texts. 
 
Keywords: Anaphora; Coherence relations; Cohesion; Context; Discourse; Text  
 
1. Introduction 
 
As the title suggests, I am going to deal with the influence of coherence relations (Cause-
Consequence or Result, Circumstance, Claim-Evidence, Contrast, Elaboration, Explanation, 
Occasion, Parallel, etc.) on the way in which anaphora operates and is interpreted in (short) 
texts.  Both coherence relations and anaphoric ones have as their raison d’être to facilitate the 
reader’s or the listener’s task of integrating the contents and discourse values of the incoming 
clauses of a text into a more global interpretative structure. Both phenomena serve to establish 
the continuity of meaning and reference without which a sequence of clauses and sentences 
would not be a text. The two discourse procedures will be shown to be in symbiosis one with 
the other (and so, to constitute ‘a perfect match’). Thus not only does the interpretation (or 
‘resolution’) of the anaphor(s) concerned flow naturally from this integrative effort (cf. 
Hobbs, 1979; Kehler, 2002; 2004), but also the nature of the in-context resolution of the 
anaphors in subsequent sentences or clauses will actually clinch a coherence relation whose 
appropriateness may only have been favored by factors associated with the interpretation of 
the preceding one(s). 
Hobbs’s general hypothesis is that once a particular coherence relation has been 
selected for integrating the propositions and illocutions derived from two adjacent (or non-
adjacent) clauses or sentences, in the sense that it can effectively be applied satisfactorily to 
the relevant units associated with them, then the interpretation of any anaphoric expressions in 
the second such clause or sentence is ipso facto implemented: ‘The solutions to many 
problems of reference and coreference simply ‘fall out’ in the course of recognizing the 
coherence relations’ (Hobbs, 1979, p. 68).  No special principles for anaphor resolution need 
to be invoked, Hobbs claims, over and above those needed for the establishment of a 
particular coherence relation integrating the contents of the two textual units. 
The article aims to show that the full reference of anaphors not only ‘falls out’ of the 
selection of a given coherence relation to integrate two discourse units: in fact, it is essential 
for the very implementation of that relation. It further shows that the integration of discourse 
units in terms of coherence relations and anaphor resolution occurs in three distinguishable 
stages, rather than in one fell swoop, as Hobbs’s characterization implies. Indeed, the true 
situation regarding text understanding in terms of coherence relations and anaphora will be 
shown to be somewhat more complex than is reflected in the account given by Hobbs (1979; 
1990). I will be proposing certain modifications of his definitions and classifications of 
coherence relations, and will attempt to formulate the semantic structure of four further 
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relations, not defined by Hobbs (Cause-Consequence, Circumstance, Claim-Evidence and 
Temporal Sequence/Narration), in terms of his system. Moreover, I will be putting forward a 
range of factors, not noted as such by Hobbs, that help create the conditions for invoking one 
or other particular coherence relation – or even more than one simultaneously, on occasion –, 
in order to integrate the content and discourse values of given discourse units. 
After a short, preliminary section (section 2) distinguishing amongst the inter-
dependent dimensions of text, context and discourse, section 3 starts by reanalyzing Hobbs’s 
(1979) key example presented as illustration of his hypothesis. It then goes on to briefly 
analyze two short news articles. This makes it possible to give an initial characterization of 
how particular coherence relations may be invoked to integrate the discourse units isolatable 
from the text. The discussion includes the formal, textual as well as semantic and 
encyclopedic cues allowing particular coherence relations to be invoked. Section 4 then 
examines the theoretical basis of a number of coherence relations, mainly in terms of two 
relatively recent accounts: those of T. Sanders and his associates and (more centrally) of J.R. 
Hobbs —but references are made throughout to comparable analytic positions adopted by 
other linguists as well, such as N. Asher and A. Lascarides, A. Kehler, W.C. Mann and S.A. 
Thompson, and E. Roulet.  Section 5 analyzes in detail three further English texts (news-in-
brief articles) in the light of an augmented version of Hobbs’s (1990) system, in order to put 
his hypothesis to the test. In doing so, it highlights some of the interactions between the 
implementation of given coherence relations and the functioning of anaphors of various kinds 
in understanding these texts. Section 6 concludes the discussion by sketching a processing 
scenario in which the facts pertaining to these interactions might be incorporated. 
 
2. Text, context and discourse 
 
As a preliminary to the discussion and analyses to come, let us first draw a three-way 
distinction amongst the dimensions of text, context and discourse (see Table 1 below). 
 
Table 1. The respective roles of Text, Discourse and Context (Cornish, 2008, Table 1, p. 998,rrevised) 
 
Text Discourse Context 
The connected sequence of verbal 
signs and non-verbal signals in 
terms of which discourse is co-
constructed by the discourse 
partners in the act of 
communication.  
The product of the hierarchical, 
situated sequence of utterance, 
indexical, propositional and 
illocutionary acts carried out in 
pursuit of some communicative goal, 
and integrated within a given context.  
 
The context (the domain of 
reference of a given text, the co-
text, the genre of speech event in 
progress, the discourse constructed 
upstream, the socio-cultural 
environment assumed by the text, 
and the specific utterance situation 
at hand) is subject to a continuous 
process of construction and revision 
as the discourse unfolds. It is by 
invoking an appropriate context 
(which is partly determined by the 
co-text, as well as by its genre) that 
the addressee or reader may create 
discourse on the basis of the 
connected sequence of textual cues 
that is text 
 
The text is the trace of at least one utterance act (whether realized in terms of a verbal, 
linguistic trace, or of a non-verbal one – which may be gestural, sensori-perceptual or 
prosodic). Among the relevant non-verbal signals are nods of the head, winks, gaze direction, 
pointing gestures, raising of the eyebrows, and so on; and in the written form of language, 
italics, boldface, underlinings, punctuation and layout generally. Text, then, refers to the 
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connected sequences of signs and signals, under their conventional meanings, produced by the 
speaker and (in informal spoken interactions) by the addressee —certain of which point to 
possible ways of grounding the discourse to be constructed within a particular context, in 
cognitive terms. These signals correspond to what Gumperz (1992a, p. 234) calls 
‘contextualization cues’ (see also Auer, 1992, as well as Gumperz, 1992b). 
The discourse partners exploit this trace by simultaneously invoking an appropriate 
context 1  in order to construct discourse. The context relevant for a given act of utterance is a 
composite of the surrounding co-text, the domain of discourse at issue, the genre of speech 
event in progress, the situation of utterance, the discourse already constructed upstream and, 
more generally, the socio-cultural environment which the text presupposes. The various 
aspects of this context are in constant development: the discourse derived via the text both 
depends on it and at the same time changes it as this is constructed on line (cf. also Connolly, 
2007; Unger, 2006). The context invoked will serve to select the relevant sense of given 
lexemes, will narrow this down so as to be compatible with the discourse already constructed, 
and will in general act to disambiguate potentially multiple possible interpretations of given 
textual segments (cf. Asher and Lascarides, 1996). It will also make it possible to flesh out 
elliptical or indeterminate references in the co-text, and to enrich allusions made in the text to 
real-world knowledge. Furthermore, it will help the recipient to determine the illocutionary 
force of each incoming clause. The genre (and sub-genre) of the text is also an important 
contextualizing factor (see Unger, 2006 for a cognitive-pragmatic account of genre in terms of 
Relevance theory).  This has to do with the user’s particular set of expectations based on his 
or her familiarity with the type of language event involved: in this article we will be 
exclusively drawing our attested examples from the sub-genre of news-in-brief items within 
the broader genre of UK or US written broadsheet journalism. Here the style and structure of 
the article is determined by considerations of factual objectivity, but at the same time by the 
need for brevity and the achievement of maximum impact via the title and initial lead 
sentence. These short articles are generally constructed according to the “inverted pyramid” 
strategy, whereby the key fact or event selected is presented first, with background or 
supporting information following in descending order of importance. 
Discourse, on the other hand, refers to the hierarchically structured, mentally 
represented product of the sequence of utterance, propositional, illocutionary and indexical 
acts that the participants are jointly carrying out as the communication unfolds. Such 
sequences have as their prime objective the realization of a local and/or global communicative 
goal of some kind (see Parisi and Castelfranchi, 1977).  Discourse, then, is both hierarchical 
and defeasible (a provisional, and hence revisable, construction of a situated interpretation);  
whereas text is essentially linear – though in the spoken medium, paralinguistic, non-verbal 
signals may well co-occur simultaneously with the flow of verbal signs and signals. It is the 
discourse constructed in terms of the text and a relevant context which is capable of being 
stored subsequently in long-term memory for possible retrieval at some later point. The 
textual trace of the communicative event, for its part, is short-lived, disappearing from short-
term memory once that discourse is constructed — or very soon thereafter (see, e.g., Jarvella, 
1979). 
The crucial point about this distinction is that discourse is a (re-)constructive, and so 
highly probabilistic matter: from the addressee’s or the reader’s point of view, it is in no sense 
a question of simply decoding the text in order to arrive at the complete message intended by 
the speaker/writer. ‘Meaning’ does not lie completely ‘within’ the text, it has to be 
constructed by the addressee or reader (and the speaker/writer!) via the text in conjunction 
                                                
1
 See Akman and Bazzanella (eds.) (2003), Connolly (2007), Fetzer (2004) Givón (2005) and Peleg, Giora and Fein (2004) 
for accounts of the various types of context operating in text and discourse, as postulated by a range of different approaches 
to language use.  
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with an appropriate context. In any event, the text is always incomplete and indeterminate in 
relation to the discourse that may be derived from it with the help of a context – including 
knowledge of the world, the genre of which the text at hand is an instance and the social and 
communicative conventions that regulate the relevant language event (cf. also Bianchi, 2004: 
pp. 3, 5; Widdowson 2004, p. 8; Jaszczolt 2005, p. 13). Text, context and discourse, then, are 
interdependent, interactive and inter-defining. 
 
3. Anaphora and coherence: a preliminary analysis of their interaction 
 
Let us begin by reanalyzing Hobbs’s (1979, p. 78) central example (3): 
 
(1) John can open Bill’s safe. He knows the combination. 
 
In  (1), either of the male human referents evoked in the first sentence may be retrieved 
in principle via the masculine singular subject pronoun he in the second. Moreover, the 
property of “knowing the combination [number] of the lock of a particular safe” can be 
plausibly applied to either of the referents at issue (to ‘Bill’, since the safe in question belongs 
to him, and to ‘John’, since this is what the first sentence asserts). However, it is only when 
the pronoun he in the second sentence is understood as applying to ‘John’ that the proposition 
it expresses can be construed as Evidence for the Claim asserted about John via the first. The 
first sentence may be analyzed as a ‘thetic’ (all-new information) utterance and the second as 
a topic-comment (‘categorical’) one, picking up as topic the more prominent referent evoked 
via the first (‘John’). Construing he as referring back to ‘Bill’ in (1) would not enable the 
proposition so created to give further information about ‘John’. Indeed, it would be singularly 
uninformative. Continuity of the situation evoked via the assertion of the first sentence would 
therefore not be assured.  Strictly speaking, rather than the resolution of the pronoun he 
simply ‘falling out’ of the establishment of a coherence relation integrating the two units, as 
Hobbs (1979) claims, this is actually a prerequisite for the implementation of an appropriate 
relation; but it is clear that the two procedures work hand-in-hand. 
One argument in favor of the relevance of the relation Claim-Evidence rather than a 
simple ‘Elaboration’ in the case of (1), is the fact that the connective after all may coherently 
be inserted between the two sentences —without altering the original interpretation in any 
way. Clearly, the expansion of the definite elliptical NP the combination in the second 
sentence will be effected anaphorically as ‘the combination number of the lock on Bill’s safe’ 
as part of the implementation of the coherence relation Claim-Evidence —partly as a function 
of the reader’s knowledge about safes. 
Hobbs actually analyzes the second sentence of (1) as being in an Elaboration relation 
with respect to the proposition evoked via the first (in the sense that it is the same proposition 
that is inferred in each case, albeit expressed in terms of different words): if X can open Y, 
where Y is a safe, then X knows the combination number which enables Y to be opened 
(safes usually being secured by this means). This is clearly the case here; but this more basic 
relation connecting the two propositions may (and indeed, must) be strengthened by 
construing the first sentence as asserting a particular Claim, and interpreting the second as 
giving the addressee or reader grounds for believing that Claim. The presence of the modal 
auxiliary can in the present tense with a stative value (the host predicator being ‘can open’) in 
conjunction with the thetic value of this initial sentence as an utterance, work together to give 
it the status of a Claim. The anaphoric link between the subject pronoun he and the referent of 
the subject of the initial sentence, John (as well as the anaphoric relation connecting Bill’s 
safe and the direct object NP the combination), contribute to giving the second sentence the 
status of a categorical topic-comment utterance, predicating a property of the referent ‘John’. 
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The tense of this second sentence is also the present, bearing a stative value via the stative 
Aktionsart (lexical aspect) of the predicator ‘know’. Hence there is no temporal progression in 
this text, the situation denoted by the second sentence being identical to the one evoked by the 
first (cf. Dowty, 1986). 
If all that was at issue in understanding text (1) were a mere paraphrase by the second 
sentence of the first, then this would violate a basic principle of communication: ‘Do not tell 
your addressee what s/he already knows — unless there is a good reason for doing so’.  This 
would be the case if the second sentence were construed as evidence for the claim made via 
the first – the speaker/writer feeling the need to persuade the addressee/reader of the 
plausibility of his or her claim. See text (6) below
2
 for an attested instance of the integration 
of two discourse units initially in terms of the relation Elaboration, which is then 
strengthened to Claim-Evidence. See Table 3 in section 4 for definitions of these two 
relations. 
Let us take a preliminary look now at two attested texts, in order to determine just how 
coherence relations of various kinds may be invoked by the reader, and what role anaphors 
play in this. 
 
(2) Hamster grounds flight 
An escaped hamster forced an Australian Airlines flight to make an early 
landing on a flight from Palma de Mallorca, Spain, to Graz after its owner 
admitted he had smuggled the rodent on board and could not find it. The jet 
was grounded for fear it might chew through a vital cable. (The Guardian 
Weekly 6-12.10.06, p. 2) 
 
In text (2), the highly encapsulated title attracts the reader’s attention through the incongruity 
of the situation evoked: however, on reading the item, it becomes apparent that the hamster in 
question was not directly or agentively responsible for the flight being grounded (as the title 
strongly implies), but played a more indirect role. Yet phrased in this way, it obviously has a 
greater ‘news’ value and its impact is enhanced. Nonetheless, the basic causal relation 
between the (unrestrained) hamster and the grounding of the aircraft in which it was traveling 
is clearly expressed via this title —which acts as a summary of and ‘frame’ for the essential 
information conveyed by the body of the piece, as well as stimulating the reader to read the 
item to ascertain the circumstances of this unusual event. 
 The first (lead) sentence is a thetic, event-reporting utterance (re-presenting in more detail 
as an ‘all-new’ state of affairs the situation outlined in the title) and does not predicate 
anything of a topic entity: indeed, the main-clause subject NP is indefinite and introduces a 
discourse-new referent which is presented as an integral part of the situation described. The 
subordinate clause introduced by the preposition after in lines 2-3 would be construed initially 
as contracting an Occasion relation (see Table 3 below, cell 1, 1st column) with the main 
event evoked by the initial clause: the temporal anteriority of the event it evokes is signaled 
via after and the past perfect tense of the verb (had smuggled). But this may be strengthened 
to Cause-Consequence (Result), where the losing of the hamster in the plane is construed as 
the immediate cause of the aircraft’s forced landing —this is actually asserted in the initial 
clause, as well as indicated in the title. 
                                                
2
 Here, and in §3.1 (where I illustrate the textual and semantic cues to certain coherence relations), in particular, I refer the 
reader to examples yet to come, in section 5. This is unfortunately unavoidable, since the three text examples presented early 
on in the article (items (1)-(3)) do not illustrate all of the textual and semantic cues or coherence relations being described 
here. To avoid tiresome switching back and forth in the article, therefore, the reader may wish to take on trust, for the 
moment, my forward references to textual illustrations of these cues and coherence relations, assessing them only when s/he 
reaches the analyses of these texts ((5)-(7)) in section 5. 
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 The second sentence refers anaphorically to the aircraft via its definite subject NP the jet, 
and as such connects up with the more global situation evoked by the first clause of the text. 
This connection is also indicated by the passive verb group was grounded, which expresses an 
entailment of the phrase forced…to make an early landing in the initial clause. The first 
clause of the second sentence (The jet was grounded) would thus be in an Elaboration 
relation with the initial clause of the text, according to Hobbs (1990), since both entail the 
same proposition. However, the modifying prepositional phrase for fear it might chew 
through a vital cable provides the effective reason for the fact that the aircraft was forced to 
make an early landing. The pronoun it must refer back to ‘the hamster’ (and not to ‘the jet’!), 
since hamsters, but not jets, can well ‘chew through vital cables’. In this way, it is in part by 
referring back to the macro-topical referent ‘the escaped hamster’ presented as the cause of 
the aircraft’s forced landing in the first clause, that the second sentence as a whole may be 
construed as providing the reason which fully explains it. So the discourse import of the 
second sentence contracts an Explanation relation with the result of the integration of the two 
clauses that make up the first. 
Here now is another attested example, drawn from American news journalism. This 
short text differs from the ones given above in that there is no ostensible anaphor (or indeed, 
connective) signaling the way in which the content of the second sentence is intended to be 
integrated with that of the first: 
 
(3)  Car Bomb Kills 9 Near U.S. Embassy in Lima 
A powerful car bomb exploded near the U.S. embassy in Lima on Wednesday 
night, ø killing at least nine people and wounding dozens. President Bush plans 
to visit Peru this weekend. (New York Times on the Web, March 21, 2002 - 
6:56 AM ET) 
 
In this short item, the title summarizes and highlights the essential situation described 
by the body of the text, giving circumstantial information (the number of dead victims, and 
the location of the car bomb). The first, lead sentence, again a thetic (‘all-new’) utterance, re-
presents in more detail the factual content of the situation described. The content of the non-
finite, participial clause …, ø killing…dozens, since it presents further details about the 
situation evoked by the first, would be integrated in terms of the relation Elaboration —the 
zero subject of the dependent clause retrieving the main event (‘the explosion of  the bomb’). 
 The second sentence is not formally connected to the first, but its content would be 
integrated into the context set up once it has been processed, partly in terms of certain aspects 
of the textual and encyclopedic knowledge presupposed (same location, Lima being the 
capital of Peru), and expected inferences from these.
3
 It is certainly in terms of the 
encyclopedic relations ‘Lima’ – ‘Peru’ and ‘US embassy’ – ‘George Bush’ that the 
propositions expressed by each of these two independent sentences are integrated: for it is in 
terms of a ‘part-whole’ relation, where the proper noun Peru acts in quasi-anaphoric fashion, 
that the referent ‘Lima’ is retrieved in virtue of the metonymic relation ‘capital of a country’ – 
‘country as a whole’. If pronounced, this sentence would contain a nuclear pitch accent on the 
first syllable of visit (…['vIzIt  pFru]…), and not on the second syllable of Peru (#…[vIzIt 
pF'ru]]…).4   This indicates that Peru is thematic and not rhematic in status here. 
Elaboration may be invoked minimally here in terms of the fact that in the initial 
                                                
3
    Schauer and Hahn (2000, p. 230) report that, in their corpus of 37 German texts taken from a wider set of reports in the 
field of Computer Science, 159 of the elementary discourse units (26.1% of the total) contained neither coreference relations 
nor ‘cue phrases’.  As a result, according to Schauer and Hahn, integration of the independent successive sentences seemed to 
require a large amount of world knowledge, as well as inferences. 
4
 The crosshatch with which this phonetic realization is prefixed here signals pragmatic infelicity in the context at issue. 
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sentence, we learn that the American embassy in Lima, capital of Peru, has (presumably) been 
targeted by a bomb blast; while in the second, it is stated that the then American president was 
to visit Peru, and so inevitably also its capital, shortly afterwards. What is held constant from 
the initial sentence in this ‘Elaboration’ by the second is the official US representation in 
Lima; to this, a further item of information is indicated as needing to be added: namely, the 
US president’s planned forthcoming visit to the country. From this purely factual basis, a 
further, more specific discourse relationship may then be constructed. 
Minimally, then, this analysis first selects the discourse relation Elaboration in order 
to ensure the integration at issue; but this may be enriched at a second stage, in virtue of the 
relevant world knowledge that a reader may have, to that of potential Consequence-(Indirect) 
Cause —that is, Explanation: see the definition of this relation in Table 3, col. 1, cell 3, 
below. Note that the possibility of such a relation here is in contradiction with the temporal 
constraint on the applicability of the relation Explanation imposed by Asher and Lascarides 
(2003, p. 160, ‘Temporal Consequence of Explanation’ (b)): namely that the causing 
eventuality should precede in time, but not follow, the caused eventuality which it ‘explains’ 
(see cell 3, col. 1, in Table 3).
5
 
 
3.1 Textual and semantic cues for coherence relations 
 
Let us recapitulate at this point some of the main textual and semantic cues that the reader 
may use in order to integrate the contents and discourse values of the sequences of clauses 
and sentences within a text.  The coherence relations we have seen at work in the texts 
presented so far are as follows: Elaboration, Claim-Evidence, Occasion, Cause-Consequence 
(Result) and Explanation. 
In the first instance, it is the predicating elements within two segments that serve as a 
basis for establishing the nature of the ‘Expansion’ or ‘Resemblance’ coherence relation
6
 in 
terms of which their contents and discourse values are to be integrated.  In more general 
terms, the criterion involves determining what is predicated of what in each unit, and how 
these predications may be related. The predicators involved may also be related, I would 
claim, in terms of the following types of lexical relations: antonymy for Contrast; converse or 
synonymy for Parallel; and meronymy, hyponymy or again synonymy or converse for 
Elaboration (see text (5) in section 5, where the predicators of the two independent sentences 
are in a relation of synonymy) or Claim-Evidence. See Murphy (2003) for a recent critical, in-
depth discussion of the semantic relations holding among lexemes. 
Secondly, the tense carried by the verb in the dependent unit in ‘subordinating’ 
coherence relations (see §4.1 below) such as Circumstance, Claim-Evidence, Elaboration, 
Occasion or Explanation may be the past perfect, signaling a shift of event time to a state of 
affairs preceding the one evoked by the dominant proposition: see as illustration the temporal 
subordinate clause in lines 2-3 of example (2) above. Such a move will indicate the non-
relevance of a possible Narration relation between the eventualities denoted by the two units, 
and instead the likelihood of a commentary on, or an explanation of, the ‘dominant’ state of 
                                                
5
 This dual possibility (a minimal ‘Elaboration’ overlain by a maximal ‘Explanation’) reflects the tendency of understanders 
to ‘boost’ weaker coherence relations to stronger ones, in particular those involving causality. See Ruhl (1974) on this point, 
as well as Sanders and Noordman (2000) on the differences in levels of integration amongst the various types of coherence 
relations. See also Spooren (1997, p. 153), who claims that ‘as a general rule, causal relations are more specific than additive 
relations’ [those of Elaboration or List, for example - FC]. Wolf, Gibson and Desmet (2004), in discussing the results of their 
self-paced, word-by-word reading time experiment, note that the critical target pronouns were read faster in the context of a 
cause-effect coherence relation relating two clauses, than in that of a resemblance relation. In more general terms, the 
sensitivity of anaphor resolution to the nature of the coherence relation most naturally invoked to integrate the contents of 
two discourse units has also been confirmed experimentally by Arnold (2001) and by Yang et al. (2001).  
6 Here, Parallel, Elaboration, Contrast and Claim-Evidence: see Table 3, 3rd column, below for definitions of these relations. 
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affairs just evoked – a situation which may point to the relevance of a relation such as Claim-
Evidence or Elaboration.  The simple present tense together with the stative Aktionsart of the 
main verb will favor a ‘generalizing’ reading of a text sentence.  See as examples can open in 
the first sentence of (1), as well as has in D(iscourse) U(nit)° in text (6) in section 5.  This is 
particularly the case where the unit initiates the sequence, and thus makes it likely that the 
utterance act realized will constitute a Claim which will shortly be supported by appropriate 
Evidence. The fact that the main verb of the initial clause or sentence carries the present 
perfect tense/aspect (e.g. has discovered in (5) below) may also serve to signal a 
generalization, and hence a possible Claim, or (as in (5)) a resulting situation which requires 
some Explanation —or at the very least, Elaboration.  In more general terms, the heuristic at 
issue here is the temporal and aspectual relations signaled (via verb tenses or temporal 
adverbials of various kinds: for example, on Wednesday night and this weekend in (3) above) 
as holding between the propositions and illocutions expressed by each unit in the text. See 
Arnold (2001, p. 156) and Gennari (2004) on the discourse-pragmatic significance of tense, in 
particular. 
The Aktionsart of each of the two predicators – whether state, activity, or event 
(achievement or accomplishment) – in conjunction with the aspectual, tense, mood and voice 
selections made for each clause, and in a wider context, the event structure of the two units 
involved as a whole, clearly play a role in the invocation of an appropriate coherence relation. 
As an illustration, see the stative predicators ‘can open’ and ‘know’ in (1) which do not 
change the situation evoked via each sentence; in addition, see the ‘achievement’ predicators 
‘discover’ and ‘find’ (the latter in the passive voice) in (5) below, which also do not cause the 
time-line of the discourse to advance (partly because of their synonymy).  See Rothstein 
(2004) for a recent discussion of Aktionsart and event structure, Dowty (1986), and Madden 
and Zwaan (2003) for a psycholinguistic perspective. A further relevant factor is the 
information structure (message organization) of the two textual units subject to integration — 
i.e. whether they are thetic (see the initial sentences of each of (1) - (3) above) or categorical, 
topic-comment utterances (see the second sentences of (1) and (2)); and in the latter case, 
whether they manifest unmarked predicate focus (a topic-comment articulation), or marked 
argument (contrastive) focus. 
Finally, one heuristic proposed by Hobbs, as also by Knott and Sanders (1998), is to see 
what connective (conjunction or sentence adverbial) it would be most appropriate to insert 
between the two units, in order to make the nature of their relation explicit: for example, then 
for the relations Occasion or Narrative, when, while or as for Circumstance, because for 
Explanation, so for Cause-Consequence (Result), and, also or too for Parallel, but for 
Contrast, and so on. But as Knott & Sanders (1998, p. 142) rightly point out, there is no one-
to-one relation between coherence relations and connectives, the latter often having several 
potential cohesive functions (cf. also Rossari, 2000). Yet they do nonetheless constitute a 
heuristic that is in principle useful (we used this heuristic in helping to decide on the 
coherence relation appropriate in the case of example (1) above). None of the factors outlined 
above is individually sufficient to invoke a given coherence relation; but the interaction 
amongst several of them simultaneously may well have the effect of favoring one or other 
type of relation in context — as we shall be seeing in the detailed analyses of three short texts 
in section 5. 
With the sole exception of the heuristic provided by certain discourse connectives, 
Hobbs (1990) does not exploit such formal, textual and semantic features in distinguishing 
between the different types of coherence relation that he puts forward. Rather, he invokes 
them quasi-exclusively in terms of knowledge-based criteria formalized as axioms leading to 
the drawing of inferences, via which the reader makes sense of texts. In Mann and 
Thompson’s Rhetorical Structure Theory model too (Mann and Thompson, 1988), no 
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systematic appeal is made to particular linguistic cues in invoking given coherence relations 
to integrate two discourse units (but see Mann et al. 1992, pp. 64-5 for a range of connectives 
recognized by RST).
7
  As a result, it is not always easy to determine whether one or other 
relation is applicable in any given instance. 
 
4. Some theoretical accounts of coherence relations 
 
Coherence relations, then, are not to be found within the co-text: they are not 
intrinsically textual at all, contra Schwarz (2001), who argues for the opposite position – even 
though they are clearly triggered via textual elements (e.g. connectives) as well as via relevant 
world knowledge, as we have already seen in analyzing examples (1) - (3) in section 3.  
Rather, they are regular cognitive ‘routines’ which are exploited by readers or hearers in order 
to enrich the texts they are processing, and in order to complete and integrate the propositions 
which they infer from these texts in terms of an appropriate context, assigning to each of them 
an appropriate illocution: so they are the ‘scaffolding’, as it were, that enables the reader or 
addressee to construct discourse on the basis of text and context.
8
  See also in this regard 
Mann and Thompson’s (1986) notion of ‘relational propositions’ – interconnecting implicit 
propositions which are automatically inferred by the reader or hearer in order to link the ones 
extracted from the overt clauses in a text. As we have seen (in each of the texts (1) - (3) 
above), more than one relation may be invoked at a time in order to complete and integrate 
the propositions extracted – so long as these relations do not contradict one another.
9
  In this 
case, as we shall also see in §4.1 and section 5, one of the relations is normally dominant, the 
other(s) being merely ‘supporting’. 
Ted Sanders and his associates (Sanders, Spooren and Noordman, 1993) have proposed 
capturing coherence relations in terms of a classification schema, making it possible to reveal 
the system that underlies them. These relations are claimed to be based on four primitives: 
basic operation (the relations are either causal, or incremental10), polarity (positive or 
negative), source of coherence (semantic or pragmatic), and order of segments (unmarked or 
marked order). Here, I will be concerned above all with the first and third of these four 
primitives. 
This schema makes it possible to characterize 12 classes of coherence relations 
(Sanders, 1997, p. 120). Sanders (1997, p. 122) defines a relation as semantic if the discourse 
segments concerned are connected in terms of their propositional content (the locutionary 
meaning of these segments). On the other hand, a relation is pragmatic if the segments are 
related in terms of the illocutionary value of one or of both segments: see the paraphrase test 
proposed as a heuristic by Sanders, given as Table 2 below.  Sanders illustrates the two cases 
with examples 7(3) and 7(4) ((4a,b)): 
 
(4) a    Theo was exhausted because he had run to the university. 
   b    Theo was exhausted, because he was gasping for breath. 
 
 
                                                
7
 See also Marcu (2000) for an attempt to automatically derive RST rhetorical text structures based mainly on cue-phrases 
(connectives and adverbial expressions). Webber et al. (2003), for their part, make a principled distinction between ‘structural 
connectives’ (because, but, so etc.) and ‘discourse adverbials’ (then, otherwise, nevertheless), whose instructional meaning 
involves an anaphoric component. The latter work does not fall within the RST framework, however.  
8
 Cf. also Givón (2005), den Uyl (1983), Sanders et al. (1993), and Sanders (1997), among others.  
9  Cf. also Asher and Lascarides (2003) and Hobbs (1990, p. 88). But this is contrary to what Mann and Thompson (1988, p. 
249) stipulate: see the RST ‘uniqueness’ constraint. 
10
 Hobbs (1990, ch. 5) recognizes in addition a third subcategory, that of ‘Ground-Figure’. See Table 3 further on in this 
section.  
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Table 2: Method for establishing the source of causala coherence relations between pairs of successive 
sentences. (Sanders, 1997, pp. 126–127) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Isolate the two segments that are connected by a CR. Segments containing interrogatives are 
excluded from the paraphrase test; they are dealt with separately.   
2. Strip all connectives from the sequence of segments. 
3. Reconstruct the basic causal operation between the propositions P and Q, which correspond roughly 
to the propositions underlying S1 and S2 (…). Paraphrase it by using one of the formulations below 
and consider which formulation is the best expression of the meaning of the CR in this context.  
 
(i) a. the fact that P causes S’s claim/advice/conclusion that Q. 
(i) b. the fact that Q causes S’s claim/advice/conclusion that P.  
(ii) a. the fact that P causes the fact that Q. 
(ii) b. the fact that Q causes the fact that P.  [Note. “S” in these definitions symbolizes ‘the 
speaker’ 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
a
This test only targets coherence relations of a causal type. See the first column of Table 3 listing the coherence relations under 
Hobbs’s (1990) account. 
 
A relation is pragmatic if one of the paraphrases (i) corresponds best to the CR as it was 
originally expressed in the text, and it is semantic if one of the paraphrases (ii) corresponds 
best to the CR expressed in the text.  According to this test, the relation in (4a) would have a 
semantic source (“the fact that Theo had run to the University caused the fact that he was 
exhausted”) in terms of (iib), and that in (4b) would have a pragmatic source (“the fact that 
Theo was gasping for breath causes S’s hypothesis that he was exhausted”) in virtue of (ib). 
Roulet (2002, p. 154) applies essentially the same test to two very similar French examples.  
Intuitively, the coherence relation relevant in the case of (4a) is the ‘semantic’ one Result 
(Cause-Consequence), while in (4b) it is the ‘pragmatic’ one Explanation (see Table 3, 1st 
column, below).  Of course (and this important point is not actually mentioned by Sanders), 
these paraphrases are only valid if the subject pronoun he in the causal subordinate clause 
corefers with the subject of the main clause, thereby ensuring the continuity of the situation 
described in the two clauses. So we see here, as we did in analyzing texts (1)-(3), the close, 
intimate relation holding between anaphoric retrieval, ensuring the continuity of the situation 
evoked via a clause or a sentence vis-à-vis the immediately preceding one, and coherence 
relation invoked. 
Let us turn now to Hobbs. I will be referring in particular to chapter 5 of his (1990) 
book. For Hobbs, coherence relations are text (or rather discourse, in my terminology: see 
Table 1) construction strategies which the speaker or writer uses to facilitate the 
understander’s comprehension task. The general coherence principles essentially boil down to 
three main types, according to Hobbs: those of ‘Causality’, of ‘Ground-Figure’, and of 
‘Expansion’.
11
  In Table 3 (see below), I have tried to classify the different sub-categories of 
relations recognized by Hobbs under these three headings. Bringing these definitions together 
in the form of a Table in this way makes it possible to compare and contrast the semantic 
structure of each relation directly. On occasion, I have modified an original definition 
(Elaboration, Explanation), have added my own (Cause-Consequence, Circumstance, Claim-
Evidence and Temporal Sequence/Narration), or have altered Hobbs’s classification 
(Explanation, shifted from ‘Ground-Figure’ to ‘Causal’). In general, I have retained only 
those relations that are illustrated in the texts analyzed in sections 3 and 5. 
First of all, in the first column of the Table, the relations Occasion and Cause-
Consequence would, for Hobbs (1990, ch. 5), both be based on causality. The Occasion 
relation corresponds to the preparation by the event evoked in the first (or second) clause of 
                                                
11
  See also Kehler (2002; 2004), who also draws inspiration from the three broad principles underlying discourse coherence 
according to Hume (see note 14), in order to model the syntactic-semantic rules underlying VP ellipsis. 
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the one denoted by the clause that follows (or precedes) (see cell 1, 1
st
 column of Table 3). An 
example given by Hobbs is: He noticed the broken connection in the control mechanism, and 
took it to his workshop to fix (example (7), p. 88).  Kehler (2002; 2004) places this relation in 
the ‘Contiguity’ category, corresponding to Hobbs’s ‘Ground-Figure’ relations. This is 
because the end-state of the temporally prior state of affairs is the initial-state of the 
subsequent one. As we have seen, the event evoked by the temporal subordinate clause 
introduced by after in the first sentence of text (2) would initially be in an Occasion relation 
with regard to the main event designated by the initial clause of this sentence. 
 
Table 3. Definitions of a subset of coherence relations, according to, and after, Hobbs (1990, Chapter 5)a 
 
Causal Relations Ground-Figure Relations Expansion Relations 
Occasion: 1) Infer a change of state 
from the assertion of S°, whose 
final state can be inferred from S
1
. 
2) Infer a change of state from the 
assertion of S
1
, whose initial state 
can be inferred from S°.  (Hobbs, 
1990, p. 87) 
Ground-Figure: Infer from S° a 
description of a system of entities 
and relations, and infer from S
1 
that 
a certain entity is placed or moves 
against that system as a 
background.  (Hobbs, 1990, p. 91) 
Parallel: Infer p(a1, a2,…) from the  
assertion of S° and p(b1, b2,…) from  
the assertion of S
1
, where ai and bi  
are similar, for all i.  (Hobbs, 1990, 
p. 93) 
Cause-Consequence [“Result”]: a 
special case of the Occasion 
relation (its “strong” version).  Infer 
that the state or event asserted via 
S° causes or could cause the state or 
event asserted via S
1
. (FC: 
definition based on Hobbs’s 
definition of Explanation — see 
cell 3, this column).  
Circumstance: a proposition P0 
expressing a state, process or event 
in S
0
 will be construed as providing 
the temporal, spatial or cognitive 
framework within which the event 
denoted by S
1 
is to be situated.  The 
main event (expressed by S
1
) must 
either be wholly included in the 
circumstantial one (S°) or overlap 
with it (FC) (see Mann & 
Thompson, 1988, p. 272) 
Elaboration: Infer the same 
proposition P from the assertions of 
S° and of S
1
. This is in fact the 
relation Parallel when the similar 
entities ai and bi are identical, for all 
i (Hobbs, 1990, p. 95). In addition, 
S
1
 must add further details to the 
common proposition inferable from 
each assertion, and e
1 
⊆ e° (FC). 
Explanation: Infer that the state or 
event asserted via S
1
 causes or 
could cause the state or event 
asserted via S° (Hobbs, 1990, p. 
91). In addition, e
1
  e° (the main 
event evoked by S
1
 precedes the 
one designated by S°) (Asher & 
Lascarides, 2003: 160). The 
speaker/writer intends the 
hearer/reader to understand the 
causal relation between the two 
eventualities (FC). 
 Contrast: 1) Infer p(a) from the 
assertion of S° and ¬ p(b) from the 
assertion of S
1
, where a and b are 
similar. 2) Infer p(a) from the 
assertion of S° and p(b) from the 
assertion of S
1
, where there is some 
property q such that q(a) and ¬ 
q(b). (Hobbs, 1990, p. 99) 
  Claim-Evidence: 1) Infer P from the 
assertion of S° and of S
1
, where S
1
 
adds further details to P and e1 ⊆ e° 
(= the Elaboration relation) and 2) 
Interpret S
1 
as rendering more 
convincing the speaker’s hypothesis 
corresponding to the assertion of S° 
(FC) 
a
The symbols ‘S0’, ‘S1’, etc. indicate ‘‘initial sentential unit”, ‘‘second sentential unit”, etc. within a given text. The logical and other 
formulae within each cell are glossed as and when they occur. 
 
I have formulated the relation Cause-Consequence (Result in Asher and Lascarides’, 
2003 as well as Kehler’s, 2004 frameworks) in terms of the definition Hobbs provides for the 
relation Explanation – where the Cause and its Effect are reversed: see cells 2 and 3 of the 
first column of Table 3, respectively. But Explanation presupposes that the speaker/writer 
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intends the causing eventuality to ‘explain’ the caused one for the addressee/reader. It is not 
simply a question of an ‘objective’ (semantic) relation between two eventualities —as in 
Sanders’ (1997) example (4a) above. I have added to the definition Asher and Lascarides’ 
(2003, p. 160) temporal constraint on Explanation, to the effect that the causing event 
normally precedes the caused event.  See text (2) above for an attested illustration. As Kehler 
(2004) notes, causal relations involve as arguments the propositions expressed by the 
sentences or clauses connected. 
In the second column, the ‘Ground-Figure Relations’ (of which Hobbs cites only the 
relation Explanation – which I have placed more appropriately under the heading ‘Causal 
Relations’ in Table 3 – in addition to this canonical relation) are said to connect a discourse 
segment to the addressee’s (activated) store of prior knowledge. A typical instance of a 
‘Ground-Figure’ relation would be that of Circumstance. This is defined by Mann and 
Thompson (1988, p. 272) as the satellite’s ‘set[ting] a framework in the subject matter within 
which R [the reader] is intended to interpret the situation presented in N [the nucleus]’.  See 
the second column of Table 3 (2
nd
 cell) for my definition à la Hobbs, inspired in part by that 
of Mann and Thompson. An actual example of this relation occurs in the temporal 
subordinate clause in text (6) below. I have added a definition of Temporal 
Sequence/Narration under this heading, since this relation involves the contiguity of two 
events, one of which follows the other in time —the second being in a sense determined by 
the occurrence of the first (this is the sequential relation). It is likewise a very basic relation, 
as are the (textual) ‘Ground-Figure’ relations as a whole. See Reinhart (1984, p. 785) for 
arguments that it is not in fact the temporal sequence of events in the represented world which 
determines whether we are dealing with Narration, but “properties of the [textual] 
presentation”. To the extent that Reinhart’s arguments are valid, this is added evidence that 
Narration is a textual rather than content-based (semantic) relation. 
Finally, the ‘Expansion Relations’ (see the third column of Table 3: those of Parallel, 
Elaboration and Contrast – to which I have added that of Claim-Evidence) would be 
instantiations of the general principle of ‘Similarity’.
12
  Kehler (2002; 2004) uses Hume’s 
original term ‘Resemblance’ for this category of coherence relations. For Hobbs, the 
‘Expansion Relations’ are relations that extend the discourse in situ, rather than carrying it 
forward or developing its background. They all involve inferential relations between the 
segments of the co-text, and function to facilitate the understander’s inferential processes. For 
Parallel, see texts (6) and (7) below, and for Contrast (which subsumes the Parallel relation), 
text (7). 
As far as Hobbs’s definition of the relation Elaboration is concerned (see the 2nd cell of 
the third column in Table 3), I have appended the condition that S
1
, the elaborating 
proposition, should add information to the common proposition inferred from each clause – 
since otherwise, the definition would amount to nothing more than a simple ‘Paraphrase’ 
relation: see Hobbs’s (1979) example given as (1) above, under his ‘Elaboration’ analysis. 
This specification is actually built into Hobbs’s (1979, p. 73) earlier definition of Elaboration 
: ‘…(but S
1 
contains a property of one of the elements of P that is not in S°)’.  However, in his 
later work (Hobbs, 1990, p. 95), it is omitted, since Hobbs (p. 96) also intends pure repetitions 
to fall under this relation. But a ‘repetition’ is intuitively surely something rather less than an 
‘elaboration’.  Furthermore the main event (symbolized as e
1
) evoked via S
1
, the elaborating 
unit, should be construable as forming a proper part of that denoted by S° (e°), the elaborated 
one.
13
 
                                                
12
 See the three principles put forward by the philosopher David Hume in section III of his Inquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding: respectively, Cause or Effect, Contiguity in Time or Place, and Resemblance.  
13  Cf. Asher and Lascarides (2003); Fabricius-Hansen and Behrens (2001).  
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Alternatively, as in the case of the second sentence in (3), this event may simply be 
locatable in the temporal or spatial frame of reference that S° will have set up. This is not an 
instance of a ‘Ground-Figure’ relation here, however, since we may suppose that the initial 
sentence of (3) was not intended to provide the background for the assertion of the (future) 
event evoked via the second. The former introduces the main event in this text, evoking a 
situation in relation to which the second merely adds a piece of information. 
On this basis, it would seem that the definitions of coherence relations should not be 
understood in absolute, ‘categorical’ terms (cf. Fabricius-Hansen and Behrens’, 2001, p. 2 
comment in relation to Elaboration). Rather, they are prototypes, whereby given relations 
between propositions or entity-denoting arguments inferable from texts in conjunction with 
given contexts may approximate the ‘core’ characterization which they represent to a greater 
or lesser degree. In the case of the second sentence in example (3), for instance, it is clear that 
the proposition it expresses cannot, strictly speaking, be integrated with the one evoked via 
the first in terms of the definition of Elaboration as formulated in Table 3 (the main event it 
evokes is not ‘a proper part’ of the one denoted by the initial sentence).  However, as we have 
seen, it ‘elaborates’ the state of affairs introduced via the latter in a more general sense — in 
terms of the different forms of official representation of the country concerned (the US) in 
Peru. The Elaboration by the second sentence in (5) below (see section 5), however, is a more 
central instance of this relation —the event it evokes being the same as the one introduced by 
the first sentence. Although he did not use the term, the conception of coherence relation 
definitions as ‘prototypes’ was already recognized by Hobbs: 
 
For expository reasons, I have defined the relations as though they were an all or none 
matter.  But it should be kept in mind that … a particular coherence relation holds 
between two sentential units to a greater or lesser degree, depending ultimately on the 
salience of the axioms used to establish the relation. (Hobbs, 1979, p. 73) 
 
As Kehler (2004) points out, the ‘Expansion’ or ‘Resemblance’ relations all involve a 
relation between entity-denoting arguments, and not (directly) whole propositions, as in the 
case of Cause-Effect relations or Ground-Figure/Contiguity ones: see the semantic structures 
of each of the relations given in the third column of Table 3. 
 
4.1 Dominance relations between discourse units paired in terms of a coherence relation 
 
These relations may be divided into two macro-categories which are orthogonal with respect 
to the three categories recognized as establishing the various types of coherence relation 
(Hobbs, 1990, p. 104): namely, coordinating relations and subordinating relations.14  
Amongst the first type, according to Hobbs, may be found the relations Parallel and 
Elaboration; amongst the second, Ground-Figure, Explanation and Contrast. The criterion 
used by Hobbs to classify the relations in one or other of these categories is that 
corresponding to the nature of what is asserted in the two sentences at issue.  For the 
coordinating relations, there is a common proposition that may be inferred both from S° and 
from S
1
; in this case, when the propositions inferred from both sentences are fused, it is this 
‘superordinate’ proposition that will be asserted. On the other hand, in the case of the 
subordinating relations, one of the two propositions15 will be dominant; in such a case, it is 
the one expressing the dominant proposition that will be asserted, once the two propositions 
                                                
14   See also Mann and Thompson (1988) for the RST ‘nucleus-nucleus’ and ‘nucleus-satellite’ relations, respectively. 
15
  Hobbs says ‘sentences’, but I think it is important to keep the semantic and syntactic levels of analysis separate here.  
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expressed are integrated.
16
 According to this definition, the relation Contrast will be 
‘subordinating’, since, intuitively, it is the proposition expressed via S
1  
that is dominant; yet 
in Table 3, it is clear that the semantic structure of this relation is very close to that of the 
relation Parallel, which is a coordinating relation. 
By contrast, the relation Elaboration is classified as belonging to the coordinating 
category, since it involves the inference of a common proposition on the basis of each of the 
two clauses or sentences involved; however, intuitively again, the ‘elaborating’ proposition is 
dependent vis-à-vis the ‘elaborated’ proposition. The extended definition given in cell 2 of the 
third column of Table 3 would strongly support this categorization. In fact, this is how this 
relation is characterized by Asher and Lascarides (2003, p. 8). I would resolve this paradox by 
suggesting that we distinguish between two levels of analysis here (cf. also Sanders, 1997): on 
the one hand, the semantic level, and on the other, the pragmatic, illocutionary level —on 
which I believe Hobbs relies in talking of dominant or dominated propositions; this is the 
level of the speaker’s moves, the domain of discourse interaction. This is also how Roulet 
(2002, p. 148) conceives of the situation, in distinguishing amongst three types of relation 
between units in a discourse: semantic, textual and ‘praxeological’ (action structure). 
In this respect, in the case of the relation Contrast, the proposition inferred from 
S
1 
would be semantically equally dominant in relation to that inferred from S°, but dominant 
at the level of illocutionary acts on the pragmatic plane. And in the case of the relation 
Elaboration, the proposition inferred from S° would be semantically on an equal footing with 
the one inferred from S
1 
(since Elaboration is underlain by the structure corresponding to the 
relation Parallel) – but would be dominant in relation to the latter at the pragmatic level. 
Nonetheless, each of the coherence relations retained here does have a basic semantic, textual 
or pragmatic character: Occasion, Cause-Consequence (Result), Parallel, Elaboration and 
Contrast would be fundamentally ‘semantic’ relations; Ground-Figure, Circumstance and 
Narration, ‘textual’, and Explanation and Claim-Evidence, ‘pragmatic’. 
The basic units isolated in terms of which the various coherence relations are to be set 
up will be symbolized in the texts analyzed in the next section, not as ‘S°’, ‘S
1
’ etc., as Hobbs 
(1990) does, but as ‘DU°’, ‘DU
1
’ etc. (where ‘DU’ stands for ‘Discourse Unit’). I adopt this 
symbol here since not all of the relevant units are full ‘sentences’ in syntactic terms —rather, 
they are minimal predications. Thus in terms of the distinction amongst text, context and 
discourse drawn in Table 1, these are discourse and not text units. I have retained Hobbs’s 
symbols in the definitions in Table 3, however, since these are mainly quotations from his 
(1990) work. See section 5 for further details of the division of a text into units. 
 
5. Application to three short news articles 
 
Let us consider now to what extent the analytic approach developed up to this point might 
enable us to characterize the way in which three short English texts consisting of between two 
and four independent sentences, would be understood. The latter are for the most part 
unlinked by connectives, and the non-initial sentences or clauses contain anaphors of various 
kinds. How does the reader understand each successive sentence in the light of his/her 
interpretation of the previous one(s) (as well as of the title, where there is one)? 
In the following analyzed texts, I have isolated clauses, whether finite or non-finite, 
coordinate or subordinate, as well as nominalized predications, as expressing the basic units 
of discourse. Restrictive relative clauses as well as complement clauses (whether subject or 
non-subject) are not recognized as corresponding to distinct discourse units —cf. also Mann 
                                                
16
  In any case, at this level, the propositions extracted from each of the two sentences at issue here are not really separable 
as such.  
  16      
and Thompson’s (1988, p. 248) procedural decision, based on the fact that restrictive relatives 
and complement clauses performing nuclear grammatical functions are integral parts of their 
host clauses, rather than constituting relatively independent units. Roulet (2002, p. 144) gives 
evidence for the correctness of this position in suggesting that restrictive relatives and 
complement clauses do not correspond praxeologically to distinct ‘discourse acts’: indeed, 
they are not capable in principle of operating in some way on the discourse model currently 
being developed. 
In more general terms, there are in fact other types of relevant unit than the one assumed 
by both Hobbs and Mann and Thompson as being the basic discourse unit, i.e. that expressed 
by the clause: for example, the one corresponding to the content of nominalized predications, 
or even to that of PPs or NPs, according to Roulet (2002, p. 145), so long as they correspond 
praxeologically to minimal discourse acts. Then there are units of higher rank, formed as a 
result of the integration of two or more lower-ranked units: see Figures 1 and 2 below for 
visual displays of concrete examples of this, relating to two of the texts analyzed in this 
section. As already noted, the relevant units in the case of the ‘Causal’ and ‘Ground-Figure’ 
relations are minimal predications; while in the case of the ‘Expansion’ relations, they are 
entity-denoting arguments. 
In the texts presented in this section, I annotate each minimal unit isolated in terms of its 
event structure (using the subscripts ‘EV’ for ‘event’ and ‘ST’ for ‘state’, as in Smith’s, 2003 
approach), since this plays a role in the invocation of a given coherence relation to integrate 
the content of two units, as we have seen. As before, anaphoric expressions, including zero 
anaphors, are highlighted in boldface. 
Let us begin with a simple, two-sentence text: 
 
(5)  19th–century submarine found 
DU°EV A British explorer, Colonel John Blashford-Snell, has discovered an 
abandoned 19th-century submarine that may have been the inspiration for 
Captain Nemo’s vessel Nautilus in Jules Verne’s 20 000 Leagues Under the 
Sea. DU
1
EV The cast-iron submarine, DU
2
EV ø built in 1864, was found half 
submerged off the coast of Panama. (The Guardian Weekly, June 10-16, 2005, 
p. 2) 
 
The title of this text reflects the content and structure of the unit DU
1
 in that it is an 
elliptical passive construction, the object discovered being the key element highlighted. As in 
texts (2) and (3) above, this creates a frame of reference into which the more detailed 
information presented in the body of the text may be integrated: also like these two examples, 
the entire text here is in fact an elaboration of the highly condensed title.  Text (5) consists of 
three basic units, one of which (DU
2
) is marked as grammatically dependent on an 
independent clause, DU
1
, inasmuch as it is a (reduced) non-restrictive relative clause in 
apposition within it. It is semantically and discoursally dependent on it as well, the zero 
subject of built being syntactically constrained to corefer with the subject of the main clause, 
DU
1
. 
The composite unit [DU
1 
+ DU
2
] will be integrated with the central, presentational unit 
DU° in terms of this same relation, for the following reasons: DU° corresponds to an active 
sentence, whose tense-aspect is the present perfect, emphasizing the relevance of the result of 
the past event designated at the time of utterance. Its subject NP refers to the agent of the 
action, the individual who discovered the 19
th
 Century submarine. The verbal predicate’s 
Aktionsart is technically that of ‘achievement’ (an event which terminates immediately or 
very soon after it begins); and the key information conveyed by this clause, namely the 
existence of the 19
th
 Century submarine, is expressed via an indefinite NP in postverbal object 
  17      
position. The referent of this NP is not yet a ‘topic’ entity, since it constitutes focused 
information. The first sentence, then, is a thetic utterance, serving to present the discovery of 
the 19
th
 Century submarine. As such, it anticipates some sort of explanation, or at the very 
least, elaboration (which is effectively the case here). 
As predicted by Hobbs’s (1990) definition,
17
 DU° and DU
1
 assert the same basic 
proposition, namely “that an abandoned 19
th
 Century submarine has been discovered”, to 
which [DU
1
 + DU
2
] adds relevant circumstantial details: where it was found, in what state, 
and when it was built (the Elaboration relation).  Indeed, the main verb of DU1 (find) is a 
synonym of the one used in DU° (discover), with the same Aktionsart; and the understood 
agent is necessarily Col. John Blashford-Snell, the agent of the action evoked by DU°. All this 
is consistent with the invocation of the relation Elaboration. Although DU1 is a passive 
sentence, while DU° is an active one, the integration of the two units is coherent as well as 
cohesive: for while syntactically the two clauses are not parallel, semantically they clearly are. 
The reason behind the choice of the passive voice in both DU
1
 and DU
2
 is the need to 
thematize the existential referent introduced postverbally in DU°, enabling it to be expressed 
in subject position (and thus empathized with – see also the title in this respect, which has 
identical lexical and syntactic form). See Cornelis (2003) on the perspectivizing function of 
passives in journalism). 
The definite passive subject NP in DU
1
, the cast-iron submarine, serves via anaphoric 
coreference to select the unit which the essential content of [DU
1
 + DU
2
] can elaborate by 
picking up in topic position (the subject of a passive sentence) the focused entity introduced 
by DU°.  It also serves to establish the identity of the referent required in the variable b2 slot 
in the second part of the semantics of the Elaboration relation, as specified in Hobbs’s (1990) 
definition. The agent is the same via zero realization and via the fact that the main verb of the 
clause (find) is synonymous with the one in DU° (discover). 
Now let us analyze text (6): 
 
(6) DU°ST Mr. Oliver Tambo has few admirers in the Conservative Party. DU
1
EV
 
When the president of the African National Congress Party appears today at the 
House of Commons, DU2ST those present will feel obliged to give him a rough 
ride. (…) The Guardian, 29th October 1985, p. 19 
 
In (6), the initial unit DU° (a thetic utterance) evokes a generalization, and hence potentially a 
Claim, which as such induces a strong expectation in the reader that some kind of evidence 
will be provided very shortly to support it. Indeed, the tense of the lexical verb have is the 
simple present, and its Aktionsart is that of ‘state’. DU1 is a temporal subordinate clause 
whose function is to provide a temporal frame of reference for the assertion via DU
2
 of the 
reaction predicted to occur at that point in time. 
The main problem to be solved by the understander of DU
1
 is this: is the definite subject 
NP the president of the African National Congress Party introducing a new referent into the 
discourse constructed up to this point, or is it coreferential with the proper name subject in 
DU°? After all, as a referentially autonomous NP, it is perfectly capable of performing the 
former function. Now, over and above the reader’s possible world knowledge that Oliver 
Tambo was at the time president of the ANC party, the parallel (subject) function of the two 
NPs here is a signal that the two expressions are indeed coreferential.  See Crawley et al. 
(1990) for experimental evidence in this regard, as well as the situation obtaining in example 
(1) above. Hobbs (1979, p. 80), whose example this is, also invokes this heuristic. However, 
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 See the second cell of the third column in Table 3, referring to the semantics of the Parallel relation in cell 1 of that 
column.  
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in my view, it is in virtue of the fact that the subject habitually codes the topic function that it 
has the heuristic force that is ascribed to it. Another motivating factor here is the fact that, 
with this coreferential connection, DU
1 
may be linked, not only to DU
2
 (via subordination), 
but to DU° as well. 
The discourse act corresponding to the main clause DU
2
 is integrated within the framing 
temporal context put in place via DU
1 
(construed as Circumstance for it: note the presence of 
the temporal connective when) through the strong expectation it sets up that the state of affairs 
expressed by the following main clause overlaps temporally with its time frame (see my 
definition of Circumstance in cell 2, col. 2 of Table 3). It is also linked via the elliptical 
demonstrative phrase those present (initially understood as ‘the Members of Parliament 
present at the House of Commons on the day of utterance when the ANC party’s president 
[OT] appears there’), which connects anaphorically with part of it. The unified, integrated unit 
corresponding to [DU
1 
+ DU
2
] is then connected to DU° in terms of the relation Evidence for 
the Claim corresponding to the latter (see below for justification).  Given this Claim-Evidence 
relation unifying [DU
1 
+ DU
2
] with DU°, the reference of the phrase those present would then 
be construed, not simply as ‘those MPs present at the House of Commons’ at the time 
indicated, but more restrictedly as ‘those MPs belonging to the British Conservative Party 
present at the House of Commons at the time at issue’. Without this restriction, the integrated 
proposition [DU
1 
+ DU
2
] would not be able to provide ‘Evidence’ for the Claim asserted via 
DU°. 
This is a clear indication, then, of how anaphora enables a particular coherence relation 
to be invoked and implemented in context. The same proposition “Oliver Tambo has few 
supporters in the British Conservative Party” is both asserted via DU° (the Claim) and 
inferred from DU
2
, so this part of the structure of the Claim-Evidence relation is reflected in 
the units purporting to be integrated in this way (see cell 4 of the third column in Table 3).  
And the Parallel structure “Most British Conservatives (a1) are highly critical of Oliver 
Tambo (a2)” in DU°, and “those CP MPs in the House of Commons (b1) will give Oliver 
Tambo (b2)
18
 a hard time when he speaks there on 29
th
 October 1985” in [DU
1 
+ DU
2
] 
corresponds precisely to the structure given for the Elaboration relation, which underlies 
Claim-Evidence. The composite discourse act corresponding to [DU1 + DU2] is an 
instantiation of the assertion in DU°, in that it provides a specific manifestation of the hostile 
attitude claimed to prevail. ‘Oliver Tambo’ is the same individual instantiating the parallel a2 
and b2 variables in each part of the structure; and ‘the CP MPs present in the British House of 
Commons when OT speaks there’ (b1) are a representative subset of ‘most members of the 
CP’ (a1). Moreover, ‘giving someone a rough ride’ in DU
2
 is clearly a manifestation of the 
generalization to the effect that ‘the person in question has few admirers among people of the 
category involved’ in DU°.  So [DU
1
 + DU
2
] elaborates DU°, and at the same time provides 
evidence for its validity as a Claim.  As in the case of text (1), one of the connectives after all 
or indeed could coherently be inserted here between DU° and [DU1 + DU2] to make this 
relation explicit. 
If it is true, as I am arguing, that more than one coherence relation is possible 
simultaneously in integrating two discourse units, then it is the semantically ‘stronger’ 
relation which will take priority over the ‘weaker’ one. Evidence is semantically stronger 
(more specific) than Elaboration, for example, since it contains the same basic structure as the 
latter relation (see Table 3); but for Evidence to be applicable, the second of the two units 
must be interpretable as rendering the assertion of the first more convincing for the addressee 
or reader. So while Elaboration is a simple ‘semantic’ relation, Evidence is a ‘pragmatic’ one. 
Both relations are compatible, since the second part of the definitional structure of each is 
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  Re-instantiated via the retrieval of this referent by means of the object pronoun him in DU2.  
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dependent with respect to the first. In general, a fundamentally ‘pragmatic’ relation will 
always take precedence over a basically ‘semantic’ or ‘textual’ one, where more than one 
relation is applicable in any given instance: see the discussion of coordinating vs. 
subordinating relations in §4.1 above. 
Figure 1 below provides a tree representation of the discourse structure of text (6), a 
representation which adapts the type proposed by Hobbs (1990). See also Webber et al. 
(2003) for a similar type of tree representation of discourse structure. I have introduced a 
device (the use of bold typeface) to represent the dominant minimal discourse unit involved in 
a given coherence relation, under the pragmatic conception of subordinating coherence 
relations, as outlined at the end of the previous section —inspired by Sanders’ (1997) 
distinction between relations whose source is semantic and those where it is pragmatic. 
 
        Evidence 
       Elaboration 
 
                                  
          DU°   Circumstance 
                 
 
 
 
  DU
1    
         DU
2
 
 
Figure 1: Schematic representation of the discourse structure of example (6), after Hobbs (1990: Ch. 5) 
 
Note. The occurrences of the symbol DUn in Figure 1 and those below should be understood as representing the 
corresponding discourse acts. The symbols in bold characters at the end of the branches in this and subsequent Figures 
correspond to the constituent (potentially unified) discourse acts which are dominant at the pragmatic level, in relation to the 
one attached as sister usually to their right, which modulates them in some way. Where two distinct coherence relations apply 
simultaneously to integrate the contents of two units, they are displayed in the relevant Figures (1-3) according to the order of 
dominance (the name of the dominating relation occurs above that of the less dominant one). These are my additions to 
Hobbs’s original tree representation format. 
 
The representation should be read in the following way: proceed ‘bottom up’, from the 
lower nodes to the higher, first moving from left to right (the ‘textual’ reading process), then 
from right to left (i.e. upwards: the ‘discourse’ integration process) as a function of 
dominating nodes. The structure of the discourse at issue will then emerge from the 
successive integrations of the units involved. 
However, this integration does not always proceed ‘vertically’, from a minimal unit 
towards an already-processed unit to its immediate left, on the textual level: for if a unit to the 
right of the one which has just been processed is accompanied by a unit marked as 
grammatically dependent on it (a subordinate clause, or a clause in apposition for example), 
then this integration must necessarily take place first. It is only then that this composite unit 
will be integrated with the result of the integration upstream (see for example DU
1
 in relation 
to DU
2
 and DU° in texts (5) and (6)). 
But this may also be the case when the units to the right of a given unit are dependent 
on it discourse-pragmatically, even though they may be expressed by independent sentences. 
See Fig. 2 representing text (7) below, where DU
3
 is extended, not only by the appositive 
relative clause realizing DU
4
 and the conjunct expressing DU
5
, but also by the independent 
sentence corresponding to DU
6
.  A still further exception is where an adjacent unit effects a 
‘return pop’ over intervening units to attach to a previously processed unit.  Here, it is the 
anaphor (in conjunction with its entire host clause) which enables this to occur. See as an 
illustration The bursaries at the beginning of DU3 in (7) below, which attaches [[DU3 + DU4] 
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+ DU
5
] via anaphoric connection to DU° —the thematic, anchoring unit for the entire text —
instead of to the immediately preceding unit, [DU
1
 + DU
2
].  It can also happen that a later 
integration will make it necessary to revise an earlier understanding —especially if two 
alternative construals of that or those unit(s) were possible at that stage. 
Hobbs’s (1990) tree representations are merely an informal device for showing the 
discourse structure of texts.  A number of them contain crossing as well as ternary branches, 
which, as in the case of purely syntactic trees, should be avoided (the trees presented in 
Figures 1 and 2 are only binary-branching). Moreover, Hobbs does not use the symbols that 
demarcate the basic discourse units in his analysis as leaf nodes. 
Finally, here is a more elaborate text, consisting of 4 sentences (with 7 discourse 
units): 
 
(7) Bursaries for volunteers 
DU°EV Imperial College London will offer annual £1,500 bursaries to 20 
student volunteers supporting pupils in local primary and secondary schools. 
DU
1
EV
 
The students will help teach subjects such as science, maths and 
information technology, DU2EV ø hopefully sparking an interest that leads to 
further study and ø provides pupils with a positive image of higher education. 
DU
3
ST The bursaries, DU
4
ST which are provided by financial service 
provider Citigroup, are available for the coming academic year DU5ST and ø 
will be aimed at those from less well-off backgrounds. DU6ST Students already 
involved in the scheme will not be eligible for the bursaries. (Times Higher 
Education Supplement 23.01.04, p. 10) 
 
In (7), DU° (again, as in texts (1)-(3), (5) and (6), a thetic utterance) asserts the existence of a 
measure introduced by Imperial College London, the subject-matter of this longer and more 
complex text. This lead sentence expands the highly condensed title,
19
 and grounds the text as 
a whole. DU
1 
is an Elaboration of this, providing further details about what is on offer for 
student volunteers at that University. The anaphoric relation established between the reduced 
definite NP subject of DU
1
 The students and the referent of the indefinite, introductory NP 20 
student volunteers in DU° ensures this connection, together with the opening of a new 
paragraph (a unit of text): the latter is thereby signaled as being primarily about the 20 
students in question.  The zero subject of DU
2
 is understood in terms of a third-order entity, 
retrieving the ‘fact’ corresponding to the content of DU
1
. The participial structure of DU
2
, the 
presence of the adverb hopefully and the obligatory coreference of the zero subject of the 
participle with a referent evoked via the clause to which it connects, DU
1
, suggest a Purpose 
relation between the two propositions: indeed, one of the connectives so or thereby could be 
inserted between the two units. The integrated discourse unit [DU
1 
+
 
DU
2
] relates to the more 
central unit DU° in terms of an Elaboration relation, in that it provides details as to what the 
students participating in the scheme will be expected to do, as well as why. 
As for DU
3
, this is another Elaboration of DU°, with the reduced definite subject NP 
The bursaries connecting via anaphora with the referent ‘annual £1,500 bursaries offered by 
ICL to 20 student volunteers’ evoked in DU° (as also, though more generally, in the title). 
This relation is specified in a parallel way to that of ‘the students’ in DU
1
, signaling the 
opening of a parallel discourse unit via a new textual paragraph dealing with the other main 
topic entity associated with this text.  DU
4
, a non-restrictive relative clause, is syntactically 
dependent on the subject of DU
3
 owing to the presence of the subject relative pronoun which 
                                                
19  Where it is not made clear what the ‘volunteers’ are actually volunteering for —though the fact that the article appeared 
in a newspaper devoted to higher education would lead the reader to expect that this would be the factor involved. 
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– although it is not strictly necessary for this connection to be made: see DU
2
 in text (5) in 
this respect, where the relative pronoun and passive auxiliary are ellipsed.  Thus it relates to 
this unit in terms of the relation Elaboration, providing as it does information about the 
source of the bursaries on offer. DU
5
 is indicated as being connected with the result of the 
integration of DU
3
 with DU
4
 (minimally) in terms of a Parallel relation, owing to the 
conjunction and which introduces it.  The NP those from less well-off backgrounds has the 
contextually-expanded interpretation ‘those [students eligible for the bursaries on offer] (who 
are) from less well-off backgrounds’ (see also the elliptical demonstrative phrase those 
present in text (6)). 
Finally, DU
6
 is connected to the integrated unit [[DU
3
 + DU
4
]+ DU
5
] in terms of a 
Contrast relation, since the adversative conjunction but may coherently be inserted in front of 
DU
6
. The contrast is established between the two parallel arguments involved in each 
proposition (respectively, ‘student volunteers from less well-off backgrounds’ and ‘students 
already involved in the pupil support scheme’), in terms of a common predicate ‘being 
eligible for’ or ‘being targeted at’: see the definition of Contrast given by Hobbs (1990) 
reproduced in cell 3 of the third column in Table 2. The discourse structure corresponding to 
this more complex text is given in Figure 2. 
 
Elaboration 
 
    
 
Explanation                DU
4
 
 
        
DU°   Explanation 
     Circumstance 
 
            
          DU
1   
         Explanation 
 
         
 
          DU
2
           DU
3
  
 
Figure 2: Discourse structure of text (7), after Hobbs (1990, Chapter 5) 
 
This example clearly points up the hierarchical structure of the discourse 
corresponding to texts, in reflection of the fact that the relations contracted by the discourse 
acts associated with the successive sentences and clauses within a text do not always exist at 
the level of pairs of sentences and/or clauses immediately following one another in the linear 
concatenation of the text (cf. Asher and Lascarides, 2003; Giora, 1985). See in this regard the 
text/discourse distinction formulated in Table 1. 
 
6. Conclusion: toward a possible processing scenario 
 
In the simple 2- or 3-sentence texts presented above, relevant general or specific world 
knowledge is activated via the title and/or via reading the initial, lead sentence or clause of the 
text (for example, in (3), the fact that Lima is the capital of Peru). On reading this first clause 
or sentence, the reader will be setting up several anticipated interpretations of what is to 
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come. This processing activity may invoke a particular coherence relation as a provisional 
integrative framework within which to connect the contents and discourse values of the 
upcoming unit. This is a function of the reader’s hypothesis as to the writer’s intention 
(his/her degree of commitment to the proposition being expressed, keyed by the modal 
indications present in the clause, including clause mood and the nature of its likely 
accompanying illocutionary force). For example, on reading the initial sentence of (1) and of 
(6), there is a strong assumption of the relevance of the relation Claim-Evidence. 
On reading the second clause or sentence of the text, the need to update the discourse 
context already established (often provisionally) via the processing of the first clause or 
sentence and the title (where there is one) inevitably arises. There are three distinguishable 
stages in this process of updating.
20 
First, establishing minimal commonalities for the states of affairs evoked — identifying 
a common location (whether geographical or more abstract — ‘cognitive’ space) in which to 
ground the eventualities that occur or exist. For example, in (2), it is ‘the aircraft cabin’, and 
in (3), ‘Peru’. In texts (1) and (6), the common ‘space’ is, more abstractly, ‘John’s know-how 
world’ and ‘the UK Conservative party’, respectively. (The time of each state of affairs may 
of course differ — as in (3)). This identity of place, conceived broadly to include ‘cognitive 
space’ as in (1) and (6), provides a bedrock for the integration of the two states of affairs 
evoked. The essential function of title and lead sentence is to ground the discourse to be 
constructed via processing of the remainder of the article. 
The next stage will be to search for evidence to confirm (or otherwise) the prediction, 
derived from processing the first clause or sentence and the title, of the relevance of a given 
coherence relation. This involves, first, fleshing out the propositional content of the clause or 
sentence being processed and deciding on its likely illocution. Cues to this will be the lexical 
relation potentially obtaining between main predicators in each sentence or clause (or in more 
general terms, the relation in terms of what is predicated of what in each), as well as tense and 
Aktionsart relations; also the possible presence of a connective of a particular kind. The 
testing of the relevance of a given coherence relation initially hypothesized will assign a 
provisional interpretation to any anaphors present in the second clause or sentence, in part as a 
function of topic-comment relations with regard to the context unit. This will make it possible 
to assess whether their likely referents can be the arguments of each predication as specified 
in the semantic structure of one of the ‘Expansion/Resemblance’ relations (here, Parallel, 
Elaboration, Contrast or Claim-Evidence). The anaphoric clause or sentence will select the 
context discourse unit with which the coherence relation is to be established, in terms of the 
type of anaphor(s) within it and of what is predicated of its or their referent.
21
 
At a second level within this second stage, final confirmation or disconfirmation will be 
decided as to the applicability in context of the coherence relation initially hypothesized. This 
will be carried out by processing more deeply various other cues available in the second 
clause or sentence. It is at this second, confirmatory stage that the complete, expanded 
interpretation of the anaphor(s) present will be implemented. The possible instantiation of its 
or their referential value will be effected in terms of that of the matching referent evoked via 
the connecting unit as a function of the coherence relation involved. See as an illustration, in 
particular, the way in which the full, final interpretation of the partially elliptical anaphors 
those present in DU2 in text (6) and those from less well-off backgrounds in DU5 in (7) is 
achieved. This clinches the applicability of the coherence relation tested in the first part of this 
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  Whether certain of the components of discourse processing identified here occur sequentially or in parallel is, of course, a 
matter for psycholinguistic testing. I am indebted to Stavroula-Thaleia Kousta for this important point. 
21  See Garrod and Sanford (1999) for psycholinguistic evidence that anaphor resolution in reading may occur in two distinct 
stages — the first involving partial or superficial processing, the second entailing a fuller integration with the relevant 
discourse context. 
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second stage, whereupon the integration will actually take place. This ‘confirmatory’ stage in 
processing will see the fleshing out by default of textually inexplicit items (e.g. that the ‘vital 
cable’ in text (2) is one that is “in or on the aircraft on board which the hamster had been 
smuggled”: cf. Mann & Thompson’s 1986 notion ‘relational proposition’). It is here too that a 
possible second, ‘stronger’ coherence relation (if compatible with the initial, ‘weaker’ one) 
may be invoked. See as examples the relation Occasion strengthened to Cause-Consequence 
in the second clause of text (2), Elaboration potentially strengthened to Explanation in the 
second sentence of text (3), and Elaboration to Evidence connecting [DU1 + DU2] to DU° in 
text (6). 
The third and final stage involves fitting the composite, integrated unit that is the output 
of this integration process into the developing discourse model, which is located in working 
memory (see Baddeley, 1987; Cowan, 1997) prior to being lodged in long-term memory for 
retention when complete. 
The resolution of the anaphors occurs, then, in two distinguishable stages, interleaved 
with the establishment of given coherence relations: initially, and provisionally, at stage 2(i), 
where the applicability of the coherence relation anticipated as part of the construction of the 
discourse context is tested for. Here, they are given provisional assignments in terms of the 
relevant argument positions within the coherence relation’s semantic structure (this is broadly 
equivalent to Garrod and Sanford’s 1999 notion ‘bonding’).  And secondly, and finally, at 
stage 2(ii), where the coherence relation initially invoked is finally decided upon and 
implemented (or is overlaid by a pragmatically ‘stronger’ one). The anaphors concerned will 
now receive a full, expanded interpretation. It is here that the anaphor’s resolution may be 
seen as the sine qua non of the implementation of a given coherence relation. The initial, 
provisional, stage in anaphor interpretation would correspond to Hobbs’s (1979) original 
hypothesis, whereby it is the choice of a given coherence relation which ultimately determines 
the reference of anaphors in the second discourse unit involved in the relation. 
Inter-sentential anaphors, then, far from being merely ‘resolved as a by-product’ of the 
implementation of a given coherence relation holding between two discourse units, are an 
essential pillar supporting the overlay of that relation in fleshing out and integrating their 
discourse values.  Just as a ‘weaker’ semantically- or textually-based coherence relation (e.g. 
Elaboration or Ground-Figure) will often be invoked by default at the initial stages in the 
processing of a multi-clausal text, with a ‘stronger’ pragmatically-oriented relation possibly 
overlaid upon it at stage 2(ii), so the processing of anaphors in subsequent clauses or 
sentences goes through two distinguishable processing stages —‘bleeding’ as well as 
buttressing the implementation of that or those relation(s). 
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